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With the publication of Hans-Georg Gadamer's 
Wahrheit und Methode in I960, and Jürgen Habermas 1 "Zur 
Logik • der Sozialwissenschaften 1 1 in the Philosophische 
Rundschau in 1965, German philosophy appeared to have 
once again entered into the age old debate between 
mythos and logos, tradition and critique, romanticism 
and enlightenment. Gadamer, a descendent of Marburg 
neo-Kantianism and the phenomenologies of Husserl and 
Heidegger, is usually portrayed as a defender of 
romanticism and what might be called 'philosophies of 
reminiscence', given his emphasis on 'legitimate' 
prejudices and the power of tradition. Habermas, on 
the other hand, coming out of the neo-Marxian Frankfurt 
school in the tradition of Herbert Marcuse, is 
characterized by his emphasis on critical philosophy, 
the enlightened use of reason, and the critique of 
ideology (motivated by an interest in emancipation). 
The stage would seem to be set, then, for a debate that 
would be exemplary in its radicality and would unearth 
the deep-seated antinomies between reminiscence and 
critique in philosophy. 
So it seems. However, to characterize the debate 
between Gadamer and Habermas in these terms is a bit 
too simplistic; the debate is far more complicated. 
For instance, Gadamer and Habermas show a great deal of 
respect for each other's work. Indeed, Gadamer's 
critique of objectivism and emphasis on hermeneutical 
consciousness are an important part of Habermas' 
attempt to develop self-conscious methodologies in the 
sciences, particularly social sciences. Gadamer, for 
his part, has commented on "Habermas' lucid analysis of 
social-scientific logic" and his working out the 
epistemological interest of "true sociologists". 
Clearly, Gadamer and Habermas are in accord on some 
fundamental points; the battlelines cannot simply be 
drawn along the lines of romanticism vs. enlightenment. 
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Another factor that complicates this debate is the 
disparity between Gadamer and Habermas with respect to 
their goals. Gadamer's interests are primarily 
philosophical; he is not concerned with the methods of 
a particular (cultural) science. Habermas* interest, 
on the other hand, is in developing a critical social 
science; his thought therefore is often more restricted 
in its scope and slanted more toward 'practical' 
aspects. As we will see, this difference concerning 
goals is a prominent feature of the debate; it tends to 
cause some confusion, because the debate is often 
carried out on two different levels. 
All of this makes for a complicated and sometimes 
confusing debate that touches on many important issues 
concerning truth and method in the cultural and social 
sciences. The purpose of this essay is to clarify some 
of these issues and the arguments put forth by Gadamer 
and Habermas, focusing, for the most part, on how these 
affect Gadamer's project of philosophical hermeneutics. 
(We will therefore not be so concerned with analyzing 
and evaluating Habermas' thought, which goes well 
beyond the confines of this debate, except as it 
applies to philosophical hermeneutics.) 
To facilitate our analysis of the debate, we will 
concentrate on three interrelated issues: (1) the 
question of the relation between truth and method; (2) 
•the relation between authority and reason, i.e., the 
central issue concerning the place of critique in 
hermeneutics; and (3) the absolutization of language 
and the resultant universality of hermeneutics. It is 
important to realize that this division is somewhat 
arbitrary; the issues and arguments tend to overlap at 
a number of points. Nevertheless, focusing on these 
three issues should help us grasp the real differences 
that exist between Gadamer and Habermas, and what that 
entails for philosophical hermeneutics. 
II 
In examining the foundations of hermeneutical 
experience in Truth and Method, Gadamer undertakes an 
analysis of effective-historical consciousness 
(wi rkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein), which is 
operative In all understanding. Very briefly, 
effective-historical consciousness, we are told, has 
the structure of experience, therefore making it a 
necessary condition of science (experience of the world 
precedes scientific analysis of it), not a science 
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itself (we do not control experiences). Experience, as 
Hegel has taught us, has the character of a reversal of 
consciousness, i.e. it is essentially experience of 
negation, of knowing that one does not know. This not 
knowing leads to questions; questions are said to come 
to us, to present themselves to us. There is therefore 
no method of learning to ask questions; questioning is 
not some sort of art or techne, as the example of 
Socrates illustrates. What questioning ultimately 
involves is openness, openness to the claim to truth of 
the other, to the 'happening' of tradition. In short, 
then, at the heart of hermeneutical experience is an 
"experience of truth that transcends the sphere of the 
control of scientific method." 
Habermas adamantly rejects this disjunction between 
truth and method. Gadamer, Habermas claims, has made 
the unwarranted jump from a proper critique of the 
false objectivistic self-understanding of the cultural 
sciences, as embodied in historicism, to a suspension 
of methodological distanciation of the object of 
inquiry, "which distinguishes a self-reflective 
understanding from everyday communication." In 
placing hermeneutical experience beyond method, then, 
Gadamer has unnecessarily obliged the positivists (who 
would evidently take this as valueless subjectivism) 
and devalued the hermeneutical experience. 
In addition, Habermas points out, this opposition 
between truth and method is unfeasible for sciences of 
action (e.g. critical social sciences), even if it were 
feasible in the humanities; "a controlled distanciation 
(Verfremdung)" is the only way 'pre-scientific' 
experience (i.e. hermeneutical experience) can rise to 
a reflective procedure (i.e. method) which insures 
objectivity. Through method, one can grasp the 
totality of universal history (one is always in the 
place of the last historian), which then allows one to 
orient oneself and society toward future action. 
Thus, in the case of Habermas, grasping universal 
history as a field of systematically distorted 
communication (ideology) implies a truth, the idea of 
true ^living, whereby idealized discourse is a way of 
life. Truth and method are therefore intimately bound 
up with one another for Habermas. 
A number of things need to be pointed out in reply 
to this criticism. First of all, from the beginning, 
Gadamer's stated purpose was to "attempt to understand 
what the human sciences truly are, beyond their 
methodological self-consciousness, and what connects 
them with the totality of our experience of the 
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world. " x v / In other words, Gadamer is attempting to lay 
bare the 'existential 1 roots of all methods, the being-
in-the-world that underlies all our wanting and doing. 
This is not to deny the necessity of method in the 
Geisteswissenschaften or to affirm the mutual 
exclusiveness of truth and method. It is, however, 
to deny that there is one method for all time that will 
give us the truth. In a sense, Gadamer is giving us a 
foundation for explaining why two different methods can 
be said to have a "grain of truth", so to speak, i.e. a 
claim to truth, by showing how all methods are grounded 
in what is "beyond" them, our being-in-the-world. 
Secondly, it is surely not Gadamer, but Habermas, 
who 'devalues' hermeneutic experience by labeling it 
•pre-scientific' and 'everyday communication 1 (in 
contrast to Gadamer, who is concerned with showing the 
legitimacy of experience within science). And by what 
standard of judgment is 'controlled distanciation 1 of 
greater value? Will not such controlled alienation 
lead to alientated understanding, which can have dire 
consequences in human sciences? Indeed, it would 
appear that the good for man, what may be called the 
'true life', can only be encountered in concrete 
situations, in experience; as a general^idea, the 'true 
life' would appear to be empty. Methodology, 
science, can and does guide us in perceiving what we 
call 'objective' truth, and that 'objective' truth is 
tied up with the method. Ultimately, however, 
methodology is undercut by questioning, by openness, by 
experience, by the hermeneutical experience that founds 
methodology. 
Habermas does not explicitly pursue the criticism 
concerning truth and method after "Zur Logik der 
Sozialwissenschaften", but the issue continues to haunt 
the debate throughout. Putting aside, then, a final 
conclusion, we should note the disparity between 
Gadamer and Habermas with respect to their interests 
that this first problem illustrates. Gadamer is 
concerned with what happens behind all methodology, 
what the 'existential' or experiential foundation of 
the cultural sciences (indeed, all sciences) is. 
Habermas, however, starts his endeavors at a 'later' 
stage, where the subject-object distinction is 
prevalent and a method for proceeding to study the 
object is necessary. This disparity, we will see, is 
important, and should be kept in mind. 
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III 
Perhaps the best known aspect of Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics is his attempt to give 
prejudice (Vorurteil) a positive connotation and,-in so 
doing, to 'rehabilitate' authority and tradition. It 
is this aspect of his philosophy that could lead one, 
on a superficial reading, to suppose that Gadamer is 
some sort of romantic. It comes as no surprise, then, 
that Habermas criticizes Gadamer's formulations along 
these lines. These criticisms are important, for they 
help to illuminate the not always clear place of 
critique in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. 
Sketched briefly, Gadamer's thesis is this: if we 
realize our own historicity and finitude, we see that 
we always stand within a tradition, our prejudices 
determining our being far more than our judgments. The 
prejudice against prejudices that characterizes the 
enlightenment blinded it to the fact that prejudices 
are necessary in order for us to understand at all. 
From all this it follows that reason, too, is a part of 
history, dependent upon the situation in which it 
operates. As for authority, it 
is based ultimately, not on the subjection and 
abdication of reason, but on recognition and 
knowledge . . . It rests on recognition and hence 
on an act of reason itself . . . Authority in 
this sense, properly understood, has nothing to 
do with blind obedience to command. 
As Habermas sees it, this claim that authority and 
knowledge converge, i.e. that authority is based on 
recognition, means that the legitimation of prejudices 
is, after reflection, still a matter of authority, 
because reflection still moves within the facticity of 
tradition. Recognition does not alter the fact that 
tradition remains the only ground of the validity of 
prejudices. This means that tradition cannot be put 
into question, given the prejudgmental character of 
understanding; such questioning is made to appear 
meaningless. One is obliged to 1 5refer back to the 
argument pregiven in socialization. 
All of this, however, says Habermas, denies the 
power of reflection, a power that is proven by reason's 
ability to reject the claim of tradition. Reflection 
can go beyond tradition; it makes the prejudices of 
tradition transparent, whereby they can no longer 
function as prejudices. A framework based on self-
re flection., that goes beyond tradition is therefore 
necessary. Such a framework is provided by depth 
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hermeneutics, in which reason, as the principle of 
communication without force, takes precedence over "the 
experienced reality of communication distorted by 
force." Gadamer's framework, according to Habermas, 
needs to assume that recognition and consensus which 
confirm authority become customary without force in 
order to work. The experience of systematically 
distorted communication by depth hermeneutics shows 
that assumption to be wrong; depth hermeneutics, unlike 
philosophical hermeneutics, is therefore.g able to 
differentiate between insight and delusion. 
Gadamer vehemently rejects this reading of Truth 
and Method and Habermas' conception of reflection. 
Though there is a 'conservative' emphasis in Gadamer on 
the assimilation of tradition, this seems to have been 
an overcompensation for philosophers' tendencies to 
'deify' themselves through reason; there was never any 
intent on Gadamer's part to say that understanding is 
merely assimilation ancLacknowledgement of the opinions 
valued in tradition. This sort of understanding of 
Gadamer ignores his admonishments to be open to the 
claim to truth of the text, and the thesis that 
authority is rooted in insight as a hermeneutical 
process. 
The first point Gadamer makes in reply to Habermas 
centers around the fact that reflection cannot question 
everything at once. The finitude of existence and the 
particularity of reflection show that every act of 
reflection is still an 'extension' of tradition. 
Gadamer puts it this way: 
Reflection on a given preunderstanding brings 
before me something that otherwise happens behind 
my back. Something—but not everything [my 
emphasisJ—for what I have called effective-
historical consciousness is inescapably more 
being than consciousness, and being is never 
fully manifest. 
Reflection, then, is granted a false power when it is 
abstractly opposed to authority, because it gives the 
impression that the knowing subject can objectify the 
whole of tradition and stand apart from it. But we 
cannot do that; reason and authority stand in a 
"basically ambivalent relation", reason being manifest 
in and through history and tradition, and therefore 
'dependent' upon them, while at the same time 
dissolving part of that tradition and rebuilding it. 
Tradition, on this view, is not a mass of conventions, 
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but a path on which understanding, powered by reason, " 
the untiring power of experience", moves, whereby "in 
the process of being instructed, man is ceaselessly 
forming a new preunderstanding." 
This brings us to Gadamer's second point, which is 
that reflection does not always dissolve authority or 
tradition, as Habermas seems to think; tradition may be 
right. This, it seems, is what Gadamer means when he 
speaks of 'legitimate' prejudices, and of authority and 
knowledge converging. Prejudices may be legitimated, 
authority may be justified, after we go to a text, for 
instance, openly asking questions. One is constantly 
engaged in self-reflection and self-awareness, to 
prevent the hypostatization of tradition into blind 
ideology, but tradition may still, in the end, be 
correct. W e 2 must, at least, be open to that 
possibility. 
This possibility is what ultimately limits 
Habermas' depth hermeneutics, for depth hermeneutics 
seems to presuppose that that is not a possibility, and 
that we only understand when we are unmasking false 
pretentions and dissolving ideologies. But that is 
only part of hermeneutics. Depth hermeneutics 
(critique of ideology) is ultimately a special rather 
than a general type of hermeneutical reflection, a 
reflection with an eye toward unmasking ideology. 
What should be clear from this analysis is that 
there is a place for critique in Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics. The key is experience and 
its 'untiring power', through which we are given 
reasons for criticizing (or affirming) tradition. Our 
openness to the claim to truth of the partner in 
dialogue, which is a necessary part of experience, 
allows us to either overhaul the prejudices of 
tradition, or legitimatize them. The process is 
unceasing; one never becomes transparent to oneself nor 
to others (as depth hermeneutics seems to imply). The 
hermeneutic experience, then, reigns supreme, in its 
ability to both criticize and assimilate tradition, 
rather than merely criticize. This absolute claim of 
hermeneutics is the final issue in the debate which we 
must now investigate. 
IV 
The issue of the absolutization of language and the 
universality of hermeneutics is closely related to the 
issue concerning critique in hermeneutics, though the 
issue now shifts to the ontological status of language. 
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Habermas rejects the ontologizing of language as 
the experience of the world, and the subsequent thesis 
that hermeneutics is a universal aspect of philosophy. 
His critique of Gadamer along these lines is 
essentially summarized in the following: 
An interpretive [verstehende] sociology that 
hypostasizes language to the subject of forms of 
life and of tradition ties itself to the idealist 
presupposition that linguistically articulated 
consciousness determines the material practice of 
life. But the objective framework of social 
action is not exhausted by the dimension of 
intersubjectively and symbolically transmitted 
meaning. The linguistic infrastructure of a 
society is part of a complex that, however 
symbolically mediated, is also constituted by the 
constraints of reality—by constraint of outer 
nature that enters into procedures for technical 
mastery and by the constraint of inner nature 
reflected in thg repressive character of social 
power relations. 
Labor and domination are thus constraints that work 
'behind the back' of language and change it, as well as 
objects of interpretation. For example, changes in 
modes of production change the linguistic world view; 
coercion changes language into ideology. Language, 
labor, and domination (power) thus form, for Habermas, 
a constantly interacting, tripartite framework that 
cannot be handled by the natural language philosophy of 
philosophical hermeneutics. The failure of 
philosophical hermeneutics can best be seen, Habermas 
tells us, in relation to science, where hermeneutical 
reflection is no longer within natural language, but 
between natural language and monological (i.e., 
scientific) systems of language, necessitating a 
hermeneutical process of translation that transcends 
Gadamer's hermeneutical reflection. 
We should take note at this point of the way this 
objection about language parallels that objection 
leveled against Gadamer concerning tradition and 
reason. If, as Habermas says, language is 
'hypostasized', i.e., becomes an object to the knowing 
subject, hermeneutics gets trapped within the confines 
of the linguistic tradition, banging up against its 
walls from the inside, so to speak. Thus the 
absolutization of language comes under the same 
critique as tradition; reason is able to break the 
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bonds of hypostasized language, indicating that there 
is a framework, based on reason, beyond hermeneutical 
experience. 
These criticisms of Gadamer's absolutization of 
language, however, miss the point entirely. Gadamer in 
no way denies the material being of life-practice and 
so-called 'pre-linguistic' experience (e.g. language of 
gesture, movement, facial expression, laughter, tears), 
nor does he claim that linguistic consciousness 
determines all the material being of life-practice. 
What he says is that 
there is no societal reality, with all its 
concrete forces, that does not bring itself to 
representation in a consciousness that is 
linguistically articulated. Reality does not 
happen "behind the back" of language 2 g • • 
reality happens precisely within language. 
Language is our mode of being-in-the-world; we know 
of no other way of orienting ourselves or ordering our 
experience than through language. What is more, 
language is "the single word whose virtuality opens up 
the infinity of discourse, of discourse with others, 
and of the freedom of speaking oneself, and allowing 
one to be spoken"; it is a "generative and creative 
power", a finite Hegelian Geist, as it were. 
Strictly speaking, then, there is no 'reality' beyond 
language; everything comes to language (contra 
Habermas' interpretation of Gadamer, which is that 
everything is in language). Linguistic experience of 
the world is then precisely that, experience of the 
world, not language, and a world without walls to be 
banged into, but a world of expanding horizons that are 
ever open to experience and fusion with the horizons of 
others. 
Thus we see that language, like traditions (indeed, 
the two concepts tend to merge for Gadamer), is a 
medium that frees man to understand and experience the 
world, and to think (thinking merely being the infinite 
dialogue with oneself). 
V 
The impasse between Gadamer and Habermas would seem 
to be due primarily to their different approaches to 
the problems in the cultural and social sciences. 
These two approaches betray two fundamentally different 
ontological frameworks. Habermas is firmly committed 
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to the emphasis of 19th century German philosophy, in 
the tradition of Hegel and Marx, on the knowing subject 
and its active appropriation of knowledge. Thus, in 
his criticisms of Gadamer, Habermas stresses 
'controlled alienation' (a method which the subject 
uses to gain knowledge about the world), normative 
standards (the true or just life, imposed by the 
subject to insure that he is acknowledged by others), 
critique of ideology (whereby the subject frees himself 
from oppression), and the characterization of language 
in instrumentalist terms (languages as a tool used by 
the subject to gain recognition, or to deny other 
recognition [ideology]). 
Gadamer's task, however, burrows under the 
methodological level of understanding by examining the 
existential/experiential roots of all understanding, 
our being-in-the-world that is the basis for 
understanding. The ultimate autonomy of the knowing 
subject is put into question by Gadamer's stress on the 
finitude and historicity of human being. The key to 
Gadamer's philosophy is experience; normative standards 
must be rooted in concrete experience to avoid being 
empty abstractions of an autonoumous will; critique is 
based on the untiring power of experience and our 
openness to it, whereby questions are given to us (we 
are given reason to criticize) and science (method) is 
born. Language, 'the record of finitude', is the basis 
for these experiences of the world, for our 
understanding, and for our thinking; it is our mode of 
being-in-the-world, that to which everything comes to 
be for us. It is the medium whereby we are opened up 
to experience and can expand our horizons of 
understanding. 
Thus, despite some of the similarities that exist 
between Gadamer and Habermas, they remain essentially 
unalike. Habermas, on the one hand, retains the 
knowing subject of the idealist tradition who actively 
appropriates the world and judges it, freeing himself 
from coercion through the power of reason. Gadamer, on 
the other hand, grants us the active, knowing subject, 
but then grounds him in language, tradition and 
experience, and his openness to experience, whereby he 
is receptive to the claim to truth of tradition and the 
partner in dialogue. Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics stands or falls on this Heideggerian idea 
of openness, of 'letting be'. He is ultimately 
successful in this debate because this idea allows him 
to account for both our sense of autonomy in 
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criticizing tradition and our experience 
finitude. 
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